A Formal Architecture of Shared Mental Models for Computational Improvisational Agents by Hodhod, Rania
A Formal Architecture of Shared Mental Models for
Computational Improvisational Agents
Rania Hodhod1,2, Andreya Piplica1, Brian Magerko1
1School of Literature, Communicationa and Culture, Georgia Institute of Technology
2Faculty of Computer and Information Sciences, Ain Shams University
{rhodhod; piplica; magerko}@gatech.edu
Abstract. This paper proposes a formal approach of constructing shared mental
models between computational improvisational agents (improv agents) and
human interactors based on our socio-cognitive studies of human improvisers.
Creating shared mental models helps improv agents co-create stories with each
other and interactors in real-time interactive narrative experiences. The
approach described here allows flexible modeling of non-Boolean (i.e. fuzzy)
knowledge about scene and background concepts through the use of fuzzy rules
and confidence factors in order to allow reasoning under uncertainty. It also
allows improv agents to infer new knowledge about a scene from existing
knowledge, recognize when new knowledge may be divergent from the other
actor’s mental model, and attempt to resolve this divergence to reach cognitive
consensus despite the absence of explicit goals in the story environment.
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1 Introduction
While there have been systems that have explored improv theatre as a model for
creating interactive narratives [1, 2, 3], to the extent of our knowledge none have
focused on the co-construction of story between an AI and a human interactor (i.e.
where neither agent has privileged or pre-authored story knowledge). Achieving this
goal requires the agents to be able to construct shared mental models (i.e. shared
understandings about scene content) while collaboratively performing an improvised
story. Shared mental models (SMMs) are a cognitive construct that incorporates the
development of mutual beliefs from individuals’ mental models until a common
mental model is reached by the group, either explicitly or implicitly [5, 6, 7]. Agents
in a co-constructive interactive narrative also must be able to reason about ambiguous
knowledge in an uncertain environment and to reach a shared understanding about
scene elements with the other actor without any collaboration outside of the
performance. We have developed an interactive narrative within the domain of the
Old West based on the improv game Three Line Scene, which focuses on establishing
the platform (i.e. the characters, setting, and joint activity of a scene) in only three
lines of dialogue. Three Line Scene allows users to provide gestural input through
Kinect to an AI-controlled avatar that is in a scene with another AI-controlled
character. This paper describes a formal approach to shared mental models for
interactive narrative agents that is flexible enough to allow human interactors to act as
an equal co-creator in an improvised scene.
2 Shared Mental Models in Improvisation
The ambiguous actions in a scene (e.g. if one actor holds their fists one on top of the
other and moves them from side to side, another actor could interpret this as either
raking or sweeping among other possibilities) and the ease with which they can be
misinterpreted can cause an improviser to develop a mental model that differs from
the other improvisers’ models. The state where improvisers’ mental models differ is
called cognitive divergence [4]. Improvisers repair their divergent mental models to
reach a state of cognitive consensus, where everyone either implicitly or explicitly
agrees on a shared mental model, through the process of cognitive convergence1 [6].
Cognitive consensus can be thought of as the process of “getting on the same page.”
Improvisers employ repair strategies to deal with divergences as they occur [4],
which are either other-oriented or self-oriented. Other-oriented repair strategies aim
to affect another’s mental model through presenting new concepts (presentation) or
correcting divergences (clarification). Self-oriented repair strategies try to align one’s
own mental model with those of others. For example, an actor may state an unsure
idea about what is going on in the scene so that others may confirm it (verification).
Alternatively, the actor may introduce new, vague information to the scene to observe
how the others react, hoping that this will reveal some enlightening information (blind
offer). Repair strategies help improvisers update their mental models and approach a
cognitive consensus that reflects their common understanding regarding how key
issues are defined and conceptualized, which is essential in story co-creation.
3 Computational Shared Mental Models
Improvisers interact through the process of proposing and responding to offers (i.e.
proposals made by improvisers in a performance to add something to a scene) [8].
While making or responding to offers, an improviser is able to model other actors’
mental models in the scene, evaluate the outcome of actions, and update goals, which
can be referred to as theory of mind [6].
Based on our understanding of how human improvisers construct shared mental
models in an improvised scene, we developed a shared mental model for interactive
narrative agents that preserves the above-mentioned cognitive behavior related to
theory of mind. The model consists of three components, as described below: beliefs,
commitments, and reasoning and decision making modules.
The beliefs component models the agent’s beliefs about itself, about others, and
about others’ beliefs (see Section 4). Those beliefs are associated with confidence
factors that show how much the agent thinks its belief is correct (see Section 4).
Confidence factors (CFs) are fuzzy values (degrees of membership values on a scale
from 0 to 1) that allow the agent to compute the strength of its beliefs in a specific
world frame, such as the emerging platform (i.e. initial scene details). CFs guide the
actions that the agent takes either towards advancing the scene (by adding new
information to the scene) or correcting cognitive divergences (by taking steps to
repair its mental model). The commitments component encapsulates any obligations
(commitments) the agent might have towards others. Finally, the reasoning and
decision making component provides the process for reasoning about fuzzy
knowledge and dynamically updates beliefs, checks for any inconsistencies that exist
(i.e. a divergence), and allows the agent to decide on its next action(s). Consequently,
the mental model may turn to one of the previously described repair strategies to
resolve an observed divergence in order to “get on the same page” (i.e. reach
cognitive convergence).
We utilize a hybrid model to describe the components of a computational shared
mental model which incorporates fuzzy logic that allows reasoning about degrees of
truth rather than exact knowledge. This logical representation has mapped well to
Lakoff’s prototype theory [10], which describes a view on how humans represent
concepts in the world, and the way we have seen improvisers describe their own
characters in a scene [12]. We represent knowledge about the story domain (e.g. the
association between characters and joint activities) as degrees of association (DoA),
which are essentially bi-directional fuzzy memberships (to know more about how
DoA is utilized in this work, please see [13]). By representing domain knowledge this
way, agents can compute the iconicity of memberships. Agents do not always want to
present an element (e.g. a character) that has the highest DoA to the other elements in
its mental model as there might also be iconic elements that hold low DoA values
(e.g. a monk has a higly iconic low DoA with talking). Rather, the agent should
present something that is iconic that conveys a lot of information about the agent’s
mental model. When an agent makes an iconic presentation, another improviser is less
likely to misinterpret the presentation, which reduces cognitive divergences and aids
in repairing the shared mental model. For example, only a few characters in the Old
West, like an outlaw, are highly associated with robbing a bank. Therefore, robbing a
bank is an iconic activity for an outlaw.
Iconicity calculations are similar to those used in [9] for Party Quirks, but these are
updated to account for the different element categories of the knowledge structure:
actions, characters, and joint activities. An agent can use the iconicities of the
elements in its mental model to determine the probability that a certain element will
be selected from its knowledge structure category given its current mental model. The
necessity of probabilistic selection is raised to model the unpredictable nature of
human behavior in interpreting context in a scene. Moreover, probability helps the
agent to estimate the level of confidence it might have in its mental model.
4 Application of Fuzzy Rules
Improv actors execute motions on stage that are ambiguous. Even a simple motion
like waving a hand can be interpreted multiple ways (e.g. waving to someone, erasing
a board, or cleaning a window). Improv agents need to entail knowledge and future
actions after observing these ambiguous presentations from a human (via Kinect) or
other AI agent. To handle this ambiguity, agents need to measure their confidence in
their entailed knowledge because it may be based on assumptions that diverge from
others’ mental models.
Fuzzy rules (a procedural representation in the form of “if… then…” rules for
handling the ambiguous kinds of knowledge we have seen in our observations of
improvisers) are designed based on the way humans reason about the likeliness of a
(random) event to occur that is: the higher the probability of an event, the more
certain we are that the event will occur. However, even if this is the case other
elements should be considered in order to come up with a confidence value that really
reflects the whole situation, such as iconicity in this work. For example, the agent
would use the following fuzzy rules to determine its confidence in the character it
thinks another agent is portraying:
Fuzzy Rule One: If agentB thinks that action1 done by agentA has medium probability to occur
and has low iconicity to characterX portrayed by agentB, then agentB’s confidence in agentA
portraying characterX is low.
Fuzzy Rule Two: If agentB thinks that action2 done by agentA has high probability to occur and
medium iconicity to CharacterZ portrayed by agentB, then agentB’s confidence in agentA
portraying characterZ is medium.
For this purpose, we use Trapezoidal and Triangular Membership Functions that
use three fuzzy values (low, medium, high), which provides high quality results when
compared to other membership functions, see Fig. 1. The x axis represents the inputs
of the probabilistic or iconicity values φ. The y axis represents the degree of
membership µ of element φ in the fuzzy sets low, medium, and high, where each term
in µ(probability) is characterized by a fuzzy set in a universe of discourse U=[0, 1].
In order to illustrate the computation of the confidence factor using fuzzy rules 1
and 2, consider a scene set in the Old West where agentB believes that agentA is










Fig. 1. Diagrammatic representation of fuzzy probabilities using Trapezoidal and
Triangular Membership Functions. The low, medium, and high fuzzy values are
used to determine the agent’s confidence based on the probability and iconicity
inputs..
knowledge to learn what character agentA might be portraying. AgentB considers that
agentA might be portraying the character sheriff or the character outlaw. Assume
<apprehending a criminal, sheriff> has medium iconicity = 0.4 and <apprehending a
criminal, outlaw> has low iconicity = 0.22. Based on the iconicities of those
characters with the joint activity apprehending a criminal, the probabilistic values for
agentA portraying a sheriff and an outlaw are φ=0.65 and φ=0.35 consecutively.
These values will act as the inputs to the Trapezoidal and Triangular Membership
Functions to compute their membership to the fuzzy sets: low, medium, and high. It is
worth noting that we are using the same membership function shown in Fig. 1 for
both iconcity and probability fuzzy variables. In order to compute the certainty factors
for the portrayed characters, the agent need to apply the following three steps for
Fuzzy Rule One and Fuzzy Rule Two:
Step1: Fuzzify inputs: Resolve all fuzzy statements in the antecedent to a degree of
membership between 0 and 1.
Fig. 1 shows that the probabilistic value 0.65 cuts the medium and high fuzzy sets
(y axis) in 0.25 and 0.75 respectively. This means that the probability of being a
sheriff character has the following degrees of membership: µ low(0.65)=0,
µmedium(0.65)=0.25 and µhigh(0.65)=0.75. Similarly, the outlaw character has the
following degrees of membership: µ low(0.35)=1 and µmedium(0.35)=0, µhigh(0.35)=0.
Repeat Step 1 for the iconicity values 0.4 and 0.22, which provides the following
results: µ low(0.4)=1, µmedium(0.4)=0, µhigh(0.4)=0 for the sheriff character, and
µ low(0.22)=1, µmedium(0.22)=0 and µhigh(0.22)=0 for the outlaw character.
Step 2: Apply fuzzy operators to multiple part antecedents: The “fuzzy and”
operator is the minimum of the degree of memberships in the antecedents, while the
“fuzzy or” operator is the maximum of the degree of memberships in the antecedents.
Applying this step on the antecedent part of Fuzzy Rule One, we will find that the
sheriff character has µlow(0.4)=1 for iconicity and µmedium(0.65)=0.25 for probability.Next, apply the “fuzzy and” operator to these results; CFrule1= min {1, 0.25} = 0.25.Repeat Step 2 for Fuzzy Rule Two. We will find that the sheriff character has
µmedium(0.4)=0 for iconicity and µhigh(0.65)=0.75 for probability. Again, apply the“fuzzy and” operator to these results; CFrule2= min {0, 0.75} = 0.
Step 3: Defuzzify outputs: For a group of rules, defuzzify the outputs by aggregating
all the rules’ outputs to produce one ‘crisp’ value using the Centroid Defuzzification
Method. Final crisp value for a group of rules = ∑ / ∑ , where mi is the
membership of the output of each rule, and wi is the centre of gravity of each fuzzy
value area. Applying the Centroid Defuzzification Method to the values obtained
from steps 1 and 2, we obtain: CF(rule1and rule2)= (0.25*0.4+0*0.55) / (0.25+0) = 0.4
Now the agent can use this confidence factor in the representation of knowledge in
his mental model as shown in the following form of logical predicate:
bel(agentB, is_a(agentA, sheriff), medium, 0.4)
In plain English, this predicate can be read as: “agentB believes that agentA is a sheriff
with medium confidence 0.4” It is worth of noting that in the transformation process
of probability to confidence, iconicity acts as an adjustment factor. The same
procedure would be followed to represent a shared belief about the outlaw character
as shown below:
mutual_belief (agentB, bel(agentA, is_a(agentB, cowboy),
high, 0.7))
In plain English, this predicate can be read as: “AgentB has a shared belief that
agentA believes that agentB is a cowboy with high confidence 0.7” Fuzzy rules are also
needed to update the agent’s confidence about his beliefs after each interaction with
the other agents. An example of these fuzzy rules is shown below:
Fuzzy Rule Three: If agentB has low confidence about agentA’s motion and has medium
confidence about agentA as characterY, Then decrease agentB’s confidence in characterY.
Fuzzy Rule Four: If agentB has high confidence about agentA’s motion and has medium
confidence about agentA as characterX, Then increase agent B confidence in characterX.
The computational implantation of this rule is achieved via using the serial
combination function (SCF= CF1*CF2) and the parallel combination function (PCL=
CF1+CF2-(CF1*CF2)) for rule 3 and rule 4 respectively, where CF1 and CF2 are the
certainty factors for the first and second statement in the antecedents part of the rule.
The agents’ confidence about the knowledge in their mental models keeps changing
based on the actions they take. Reaching cognitive consensus requires the agents to
understand each other. In fact, shared mental models can be measured in terms of the
degree of overlap or consistency among team members’ knowledge and beliefs [11].
5 Discussion
This paper presents a computational shared mental model for improv agents based on
preliminary modeling efforts and studies of human improvisers. The goal of our
model is to a) formally represent of our findings of how human improvisers negotiate
shared mental models and b) support intelligent agents’s ability to improvise scenes
with each other or with a human interactor. This model provides the flexibility for
improv agents to infer and extrapolate to new knowledge from their interaction based
on their current shared mental models. Improv agents can be employed in games
environments where they can reason about fuzzy uncertain knowledge and interact
with human without relying privileged knowledge or communication. The fuzzy rules
can be applied to other domains and can also be edited to include any number of
factors (evidences) that might affect the generated confidence. In its current state, this
approach does not capture all of the complexities of a full theory of mind because
assessments are only based on degrees of association. For example, agents with the
kind of shared mental models described here cannot reason about privileged
knowledge (e.g. knowledge that only one agent knows because the other agent was
not present to hear it), which a full theory of mind can account for.
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